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Sovereignty, Federalism, and the Identification of Local
Environmental Problems
Randall Lutter*
Terry Anderson and Bishop Grewell have recently argued that misplaced
concerns about international environmental degradation have adverse effects on US
foreign policy and US interests. Trade suffers and economic growth falters, thereby
reducing resources available for environmental protection. Sovereignty and
accountability are both compromised. To avert these problems, they recommend a
variety of policy changes including promotion of economic growth, curtailment of
environmentally destructive policies, and support for sovereign states that are
respectful of property rights and the rule of law.
One of their recommendations in particular merits more attention. Anderson
and Grewell write, "If an environmental problem can be handled internally, there is no
need for international regulations that encourage encroachment on sovereign powers
and discourage democratic accountability."' The strength of this recommendation
depends on what is meant by "handled internally." Given the trend toward malting
more and more environmental problems international, it would be useful to have a
test to identify those problems that can be handled internally. Such a test could
provide a principled means to identify environmental problems best left to local
authorities. International bodies or sovereign states could pledge to pursue
agreements on only those environmental problems that are truly international in
scope.
In this article, I elaborate on the Anderson and GreweU recommendation by
arguing for a test to identify which environmental problems can be handled internally
and for a commitment to focus foreign policy on international, not local,
environmental problems. I first illustrate how international environmental regulations
can cause harm by exploring how the Basel Convention stopped the export of scrap
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1. See Terry Anderson and Bishop Grewell, It Isn't Easy Being Grevi: Divirotmenal Pcq Irnr atns ftr
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ships to south Asia.2 I then review how federal environmental policies in the United
States are imposed as solutions for all manner of local environmental problems and
point out that a trend towards centralized environmental policymaking at the
international level is likely because the causes of centralized decisionmaking within the
United States also exist at an international level. I then outline an economically sound
approach to identify environmental problems that can be handled internally and
develop a practical definition of such problems. Finally, I make recommendations
that might help focus international organizations' involvement in environmental
policy development only where local solutions are inappropriate.
I. THE PROBLEM: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND TRADE
The problem of environmentalism as a threat to sovereignty is often quite
abstract. Authors describe the problem in terms of reduced democratic accountability
and amorphous reductions to trade and economic growth. One instructive example
that may help to clarify the nature of the problem involves the Basel Convention on
disposal of hazardous materials.3 This treaty and its administration by the United
States have scuttled some valuable US exports to other countries and thus reduced
welfare in the United States and abroad.
The Basel Convention restricts the export for disposal of materials deemed
hazardous, including a class of persistent organic carcinogenic pollutants called
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs").4 Electrical equipment manufacturers used PCBs
in liquid form in large quantities for decades both in the United States and abroad. In
1976 Congress gave the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") authority to
regulate the production, use, and sale of PCBs after reports that they accumulated in
fish tissue and hindered reproduction of piscivorous birds.' PCBs were subsequently
found in the insulation protecting electrical equipment on older ships. The EPA and
the scientific community generally have not presented evidence that PCBs occurring
in solids in low concentration pose a significant risk.6 But the Basel Convention, at
least as the EPA interpreted it, treated these PCBs like the genuinely hazardous,
liquid PCBs.
2. See US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, RCRA Orientation Manual 111-52-
111-53 (1998), available online at <http://www.epa.gov/OSWRCRA/general/orientat/> (visited
Sept 30, 2001).
3. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 28 ILM 657 (1992).
4. PCBs are specifically mentioned in Annex VIII (A1180 and A3180) and Annex IX (B1040 and
B1110); see United Nations Environment Programme, Official Web Site of the Secretariat of the Basel
Convention, available online at <http://www.basel.int> (visited Sept 30,2001).
5. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC § 2601 et seq (1994).
6. For further discussion, see the preamble of US Environmental Protection Agency, Disposal of
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs); Final Rule, 63 Fed Reg 35384, 35411 (1998).
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In 1994, the EPA proposed a rule designed to control rransboundary movement
of PCB waste in a manner consistent with the Basel Convention.7 It would
allow export for disposal of PCB waste at concentrations of 50 ppm or greater on a
case-by-case basis unless EPA has reason to believe that the PCBs in question vill
not be properly managed, where the receiving country has an international
agreement consistent with the international obligations of the United States ...
[Additionally,] the receiving country certifies to lPA that it has received accurate
and complete information alout the waste, consents to receive it, and has adequate
disposal facilities to assure proper management;, and the exporer identifies waste
containing liquid PCBs or PCB-containing electrical equipment.
EPA also acknowledged that PCBs were present in parts integral to ships that
might be exported for scrap.
Many ships owned by the US Maritime Administration ("MARAD") were
presumed to have PCBs present. Congress had charged MARAD to dispose of its
ships expeditiously and to get the maximum value for US taxpayers." These ships
could not be sold for scrap in the United States, because concerns over liability
associated with PCBs and other contaminants such as lead-based paint discouraged
potential buyers. Yet the risks from PCBs were negligible because they were
incorporated into wire cable or gaskets.
Between 1987 and 1994, MARAD exported 128 vessels to China, India, Mexico,
and Taiwan (of 130 vessels sold, total). In 1998, MARAD, having sold no vessels for
overseas scrapping since the release of EPA's proposed rule in 1994, officially
suspended sales of vessels for overseas scrapping. Later that year, the Clinton
administration placed a moratorium on overseas scrapping and required MARAD to
request approval from the EPA to sell vessels overseas to markets that are capable of
scrapping in an environmentally compliant manner.0 In 2000, MARAD's inventory,
which is still anchored in US waters, numbered 110 ships, at least 40 of which were in
particularly bad condition. In addition, the Navy had over 100 obsolete ships waiting
to be scrapped."
Inhibiting the trade in these ships has left both the United States and potential
trading partners worse off. The US Treasury, and by inference the US taxpayer, has
lost the value of the ships. Salvage and recycling businesses and workers have lost a
profitable opportunity to convert a large quantity of high quality steel to industrial
7. See US Environmental Protection Agency, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Manufactunng,
Processing, and Distribution in Commerce, Proposed Decision on Exemption Petitions. Propoed
Rules, 59 Fed Reg 62788, 62816 (1994).
8. Id at 62817.
9. See National Maritime Heritage Act, 16 USC § 5405(c)(1)(B) (1994).
10. See the memo from the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Heanrtg On
Disposal of Obsoldete Maritime Adininistration Vessels, May 24, 2000, available online at
<http://www.house.gov/transporcation/cgmt/hearing/05-24-00/05-24-O0memo.hnnl> (visited
Sept 30,2001).
11. See id.
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and commercial use. Although the environmental risks from PCBs incorporated into
solids are minimal, the ships continue to leak minute quantities of contaminants in
US waters, while other sources of pollution in these waters are subject to costly
controls. In addition, the PCB related risks to salvage workers are trivial when
compared with the very large and real risks to health and safety associated with
poverty. Thus, US exports of these ships would promote welfare at home and abroad.
This example shows how an international treaty intended to address global
environmental problems, when coupled with overly stringent compliance efforts in the
United States, can lower overall welfare by limiting beneficial international trade.
II. FEDERALISM IN US ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The extensive US experience with environmental policy and federalism may
provide insights about sovereignty in international environmental affairs. The lack of
respect for sovereignty outlined above is mirrored by a paternalism that the US federal
government often shows toward state and local governments. Three examples
demonstrate the lack of genuine federalism in the United States.
The case of arsenic in drinking water illustrates well how the US federal
government has assumed responsibility for environmental risks that are entirely local.
Although the Bush Administration has announced that it is seeking to issue an
arsenic standard less stringent than the one promulgated by the EPA at the end of the
Clinton Administration, it has not questioned the need for a single mandatory
uniform national standard. 2 But in our federal system of government such a standard
makes little sense.
Contaminants in drinking water, unlike pollutants in the air or in lakes and
streams, do not cross state boundaries. Arsenic in drinking water differs from other
forms of pollution because no profit motive pushes entrepreneurs to peddle
contaminated water. Utilities controlled by local governments supply the vast
majority of US tap water." At the low levels found naturally in groundwater in the
United States, arsenic poses risks only to people exposed for many years. These
people are residents of local communities who have concerns about both health and
12. For more details, see US Enviromental Protection Agency, Office of Ground Water and Drinking
Water, Arsenic, available online at <http://www.epa.gov/safewater/arsenic.html> (visited Sept 30,
2001).
13. According to the EPA, 263.9 million people are served by community water systems-96 percent of
the US population. See Environmental Protection Agency, Public Drinking Water Systemns: Facts and
Figures, available online at <http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pws/facoids.hml> (visited Sept 30,
2001).
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pocketbooks that presumably matter to the local governments in control of tap water
14treatment and distribution systems.
Local governments' decisions about tap water purity are likely to be sensible
because tap water consumers are adequately informed about possible health risks.
They already receive federally mandated reports about contaminants found in
drinking water and the associated risks to health.S
Americans already trust local governments with many important decisions
affecting health and safety. Local governments provide police protection, fight fires,
and regulate ambulance services. Deciding how pure to make tap water is not
qualitatively different from these risk management decisions.
The federal government has the scientific expertise to assess risks better than
local governments. Using this expertise, it should establish recommended drinking
water standards. But federal mandates that local governments act and pay the bill are
simply paternalistic.
A second example of federal regulation of local environmental problems pertains
to toxic waste. The federal program regulating toxic waste sites is the Superfund
program, which the EPA administers under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. 6 Risks from such wastes are local,
essentially because the key route of exposure is consumption of dirt or of
contaminated groundwater and groundwater moves slowly.' 7 The costs of controlling
wastes may be borne locally or nationally depending on whether the responsible
parties are local. Thus local authorities have adequate incentives to regulate. Yet ever
since various toxins were found in Love Canal, Congress and the EPA have developed
and used the Superfund program to make a federal case out of this local problem.'
Moreover, the federal reg-ulations have been too stringent to be efficient.
Hamilton and Viscusi recently concluded a monumental review of the Superfund
program including an assessment of the costs of reduced cancer risks posed by all
identified carcinogens and all identified exposure pathways at certain sites. Hamilton
14. See US Environmental Protection Agency. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic
and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring; Final Rule, 66 Fed
Reg 6976,7003-07 (2001).
15. For a list of information that must be presented in these federally mandated reports, =c US
Environmental Protection Agency, Final Consumer Confido:ce ReTort Rule Re.jures Annual lWater
Quality Reports, available online at <htrp://%vwv.epa.gov/safcwater/ccr/ccfacr.hml> (visited Sept
30,2001).
16. Pub L No 96-510, 94 Star 2767 (1980) and Pub L No 96-561, 94 Star 3300 (1980). colified at 42
USC § 9601 er seq (1994).
17. For an examination of the spatial extent of risk from Superfund sites, see James T. Hamilton and
W. Kip Viscusi, Cakulating Risks: Te Spatial and Political Dinaisions of Hazardous Waste P!1. (MIT
1991).
18. For further discussion, see Jerry Taylor, Salting the Eard: The Case far Relzali.g Suprfur., 18
Regulation 55 (1995).
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and Viscusi reported that 141 of 145 sites studied had a cost per cancer case averted of
more than $100 million.9 This estimate is likely to be too low because it uses cancer
risk assessment methods that are deliberately conservative.' Even at face value,
however, Hamilton and Viscusi's estimate is vastly greater than estimates of
consumers' willingness to pay to reduce statistical cancer risks.21 In addition, Lutter
and Mader show that lead, the most prevalent chemical associated with non-cancer
risks, is regulated more stringently in Superfund sites than in people's backyards, and
that the stringent standards for lead clean-up at Superfund sites are quite unlikely to
pass a cost-benefit test.'
A final example of federal regulation of local environmental problems is
municipal solid waste disposal. Under Subpart D, EPA has promulgated regulations
dictating the design and construction of municipal waste disposal.23 As with drinking
water, there is no profit motive driving municipalities to make money by managing
dumps in a way that imposes unreasonable health risks on local residents. Yet Federal
standards require that municipalities comply with a uniform numeric national
standard.
Of course not all environmental problems are so local in scope. Many regional
air or water pollution problems call for federal rather than local action. But the overall
tendency of US environmental policy is for Washington to monopolize
decisionmaking and reserve or delegate only relatively unimportant details to states
and localities.
III. REASONS FOR CENTRALIZED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING
Identifying the causes of centralized environmental policymaking in the United
States is important to the extent that the development of environmental policy in the
United States has predictive value for the development of international environmental
policy.
There are substantial public misperceptions about the nature of most
environmental risks. Popular media accounts pay insufficient attention to the severity
and likelihood of risks to health. Too often, advocates (and even scientists) describe a
19. See James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly is Clean? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs
of Superfund Site Remnediations, 18J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 2, 3 (1998).
20. See Albert L. Nichols and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk
Assessments Distort Regulation, 9 Regulation 13 (Nov/Dec 1986); V. Kerry Smith, Advances in Applied
Microecononics Uai 1987).
21. See, for example, Alan Krupnick, et al, Age, Health, and the Willingness to Pay for Mortality Risk
Reductions: A Contingent Valuation Survey of Ontario Residents,J Risk & Uncertainty (forthcoming).
22. See Randall Lurter and Elizabeth Mader, Is Your Backyard Safer Than a Hazardous Waste Site? EM:
Air and Waste Management Association's Magazine for Environmental Managers 16-21 (Sept
2001).
23. Criteria for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 40 CFR § 258 (2001).
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particular threat in terms that help make the case that stringent control action is
needed Thus arsenic is tagged a carcinogen without a description of the relatively
low risks resulting from exposure in the relevant rangeP Similarly, mercury is
identified as harming 60,000 children per year, without regard to the severity of the
harm& Asbestos fears result in school closings even though the risks are trivially small
and less than the risks to children of playing elsewhere while the asbestos is removed.'
These misperceptions stem from the complicated nature of most environmental
risks and costs to private parties of acquiring more information about the topics in
question. For instance, the finding that diethylene-trichloromegadeath is carcinogenic
makes the headlines. The risk may be negligible because the dose is virtually nil and
the dose, after all, makes the poison. But this observation never displaces the headline
that it causes cancer.
Second, public misunderstanding about small environmental risks prompts
promises or action from politicians who need to be responsive to voters. As a result,
many politicians support banning pesticides or fighting air pollution irrespective of
cost or feasibility. The more reasoned response-that pesticides make fruits and
vegetables affordable, thereby improving health, or that health risks from the air
pollution in question are very small compared with relevant measures of cost-is lost
in the clamor.' Uncertainty about the magnitude of environmental risks makes it very
difficult for politicians to withstand the desire to fight the plague dujour.
Third, regulatory costs tend to be a distant concern to most Washington
policymakers. Although federal spending has obvious implications for the federal
budget, regulatory costs are off the federal books, often incurred only several years in
the future, and can be controlled through judicious use of enforcement discretion.
Typically, some private companies will support stringent regulation because it
provides a strategic comparative advantage. Such support counterbalances concerns
expressed by other industry representatives that the costs are onerous and
24. For an explanation by 'climate scientist' Stephen Schneider. see Jonathan Schell. Our Fraii!r Earth,
Discover 44 (Oct 1989) ([Scientists] have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified, dramanc
statements, and make little mention of any doubts we might have... Each of us has to decide what
the right balance is between being effective and being honest.J.
25. See 66 Fed Reg at 7003-07 (cited in note 14).
26. See National Research Council, Toxicobcal Effezts of Med)Ihnercury 35 (National Academy 2000);
Randall Lutter and Elizabeth Mader, Health Risks From Mercury.Contamirated Fuh: A Reassessmnw.
available online at <http://v v.aei.brooldngs.org/publications/related/merury.pf> (%isited Sept
30,2001).
27. See US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Risk to Students in Sr:,ol 197 (1995); se also
Daniel Goleman, Hidden Rules Often Distort Ideas of Ris, NY Times C1 (Feb 1, 1994).
28. For more information on pesticide regulation, see Bruce Ames and Lois Gold, 71: Causes an.
Prevention of Cancer, in Robert XV. Hahn, ed, Risks. Costs and Lives Saved 4 (Oxford 1936); for a
discussion of the costs of ozone regulation, see Randall Lutter, Is EPA's Ozorne Sjanard Feas, Z.?
(AEI-Brookings 1999).
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burdensome. As a result regulatory costs rarely get the same attention in Washington
policy circles as, for example, federal spending or taxes.
What policy reforms might limit such extensive influence of federal regulations
into areas of essentially local concern? Executive orders to respect federalism in
rulemaking and laws about unfunded mandates have generally had little effect."' One
model that merits further attention is that of an "independent" scorekeeper. In the
United States, Congress has granted a measure of independence to institutions that
have served such a role. First is the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"), which has
authority to assess budgetary implications of proposed changes in law. This
authority, in part because of the deft way CBO has used it, has been sufficient to deter
Congress from adopting some prominent laws such as President Clinton's 1993
health care reform proposal. The Energy Information Agency ("EIA"), a quasi-
independent arm of the Department of Energy, has sometimes offered its own
estimates of the costs of specific proposals. In its review of the Kyoto Protocol, EIA
developed cost estimates much higher than those of the Administration and so served
to diminish substantially any support in Congress for that agreement. Finally,
Congress last year enacted the Truth in Regulating Act, which charges the General
Accounting Office with reviewing economically significant regulations.3'
In principle, an independent office could be charged with identifying the local
nature of environmental problems so as to clarify the merit of action by federal, as
opposed to local, authorities. The US experience with federalism in addressing
environmental problems thus supports the potential value of guidelines to help
distinguish local environmental problems from ones that are national (or
international) in scope.
IV. IDENTIFYING GENUINE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS:
TOWARDS A USEFUL TEST
Is there a test to distinguish such local environmental problems from others,
such as global warming, which cannot be efficiently controlled by purely local actions?
Many such problems involve border disputes that historically were resolved by
peaceful negotiations between affected countries. Large-scale problems involving
many different countries are a new phenomenon. For example, the Montreal
Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, and other treaties involve all countries, even those that
do not engage in the economic activity that creates the risks. These large-scale
problems are international rather than simply transboundary3
29. See Angela Antoneli, Promises Unfulilled: Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 19 Regulation 44
(1996).
30. Truth in Regulating Act of 2000, Pub L No 106-312, 114 Star 1248 (2000).
31. See Anderson and Grewell, 2 ChiJ Intl L at 437-38 (cited in note 1).
Vo. z 9o. 2
Soverenty. Te&raftsm, andtle Identification ofLocaf&nviron,nenita( roffez
Within the field of environmental economics, the identification of international
environmental problems is a manageable situation. The first step is whether
international effects exist as a matter of physical science. Does the pollutant in
question cross borders in the way that sulfur dioxide emitted from power plants in the
Ohio River Valley crosses the US-Canadian border into Ontario or measurable
radiation from Chernobyl crossed from Ukraine into other eastern European
countries? Even if the pollutant in question does not cross borders, there may still be
international effects as occurs, for example, with pollution effects on migratory species
like monarch butterflies or certain songbirds.
The second step in identifying international problems relates to their policy
significance. Are the effects of international pollution large enough to merit a policy
response of some sort? For example, emissions of a carcinogenic air pollutant that
increase the lifetime risk of cancer by 10' do not have any policy relevance. This
conclusion holds regardless of whether the source of the pollution is down the street
or on the other side of the globe. The policy implications would be different,
however, if the lifetime cancer risk were one in a hundred. If pollution caused such
risks, one would expect governments, at least those in industrialized countries, to
respond with a "command and control" policy. In this sense the international effects
are relevant to policymakers although they may originate from a source beyond their
control.
The third step in the identification of international effects that merit a
coordinated international response is an assessment of the plausibility of Coasian
solutions. Coase argued that in the presence of well-defined property rights, private
parties are capable of negotiating solutions to problems of inefficiency (a caveat, of
course, involves transaction costs). Border disputes involving two or three countries
that disagree over the use of scarce water resources may plausibly be resolved by
negotiations among the interested parties. But for problems involving many
countries, higher transaction costs can forestall reasonably efficient outcomes without
framework agreements.
Environmental problems thus merit a coordinated international response if they
have measurable cross-border effects, if these are large enough to have some policy
significance, and if the problems are unlikely to be remedied by Coasian solutions
negotiated by neighboring countries. Such a guideline may clarify the appropriate
level of government to address different environmental problems.
V. CONCLUSION
As shown by the PCB experience, international environmental treaties can
hinder trade and reduce the welfare of countries that would otherwise participate in
trade. To limit such problems, I propose a three-step test to help identif,
environmental problems that can be handled internationally. Environmental problems
merit a coordinated international response if they have measurable cross-border
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effects, if they are large enough to have some policy significance, and if the problems
are unlikely to be remedied by Coasian solutions negotiated by neighboring countries.
An international body could be charged with applying such a test to distinguish local
environmental problems from those that are truly international. In addition, the
United States acting unilaterally could announce that local governments have
responsibility for remedying an identifiable class of environmental problems while
acknowledging that genuinely international environmental problems, like global
warming, merit a coordinated response.
Vo. 2 No. 2
